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The February 1995 collapse of the British merchant bank, Barings
Plc, and the announcement in June 1996 by the Sumitomo Corpora-
tion of copper trading losses in excess of 2 billion dollars are only two
of the more recent events underscoring the global complexity of finan-
cial markets today. The failure of Barings resulted from unhedged
proprietary positions in the Nikkei 225 on the Singapore International
Monetary Exchange (SIMEX) and the Osaka Stock Exchange. This
precipitated actions by financial regulatory and market authorities in
Singapore, Japan, Hong Kong, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. The events surrounding Sumitomo spanned three jurisdictions:
the United Kingdom, where Sumitomo was trading on the London
Metal Exchange (LME), the United States, where the LME recently
had established a warehouse for delivery of copper (and where copper
is traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange), and Japan, where
Sumitomo is legally domiciled.
* Jane C. Kang, Special Counsel for International Regulatory Matters, Division of Trading
and Markets, Commodity Futures Trading Commission: JD, Georgetown University Law
Center, BA, George Washington University
The views expressed herein are those solely of the author and do not necessarily reflect
those of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission or any office or unit of the Commission.
The author wishes to thank John Riedel, also of the Division, for his research assistance. The
author is especially grateful to PA Thorpe, Chief Executive of the U.K. Investment Management
Regulatory Organisation, whose comments greatly improved both the substance and exposition
of the paper. The author alone is responsible for any errors or omissions in the article.
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Today, derivative products' trade around the clock and around
the globe, on and off exchange, on screen-based trading systems and
in open outcry pits, and through international linkage arrangements
involving both screen systems and floor systems. Between 1986 and
1995, world futures volume increased 650% with a corresponding in-
crease in geographic diversity.2 In 1995, the ten most active exchanges
were located in five countries-Brazil, France, Germany, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.
Recently, the move toward more free market economies in East-
ern Europe, Asia, and Latin America has promoted the development
of capital markets, and futures and options exchanges to assist in the
transition. Since 1990, over 20 futures exchanges have begun opera-
tion in Africa, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America.
There is also increasing competition among the established inter-
national markets for volume in the same or related products. For ex-
ample, the Nikkei 225 material, in respect to Barings above, trades not
only on the Osaka Stock Exchange and SIMEX, but also on the Chi-
cago Mercantile Exchange (CME). Other examples include the Ger-
man Bund, which is traded on the London International Financial and
Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE), the German Deutsche
1 A derivative instrument, broadly defined, is a contract whose value is derived from or is
dependent on one or more underlying assets or indexes. Derivatives can include a wide assort-
ment of financial contracts, including forwards, futures, swaps, and options. The primary eco-
nomic function of derivatives is the transfer of market risk resulting from an adverse change in
the price of an asset or portfolio of assets. By their nature, such instruments can be highly
leveraged, and therefore, highly risky. Derivatives are entered throughout the world on organ-
ized exchanges, in which case they are generally standardized as to maturity, contract size and
delivery terms, and over-the-counter (OTC), which are products tailored to meet a particular
institution's risk hedging needs.
The OTC derivatives marketplace does not consist of a distinct category of products having
common characteristics, and there are no agreed standards, minimum or otherwise, applicable to
all such products. See COMMODITY FrrruRrs TRADING COMMISSION, OTC DERIVATIVE MAR-
KETs AND Trmm REGULATION, at 87 (Oct. 1993). The regulatory treatment of OTC derivatives
raises a variety of issues which are beyond the subject of this article, which is concerned primar-
ily with exchange-traded futures and commodity options contracts. For ease of reference, such
exchanges are referred to herein as "futures exchanges" or "futures markets."
2 Unless otherwise specified, technical data and volume information contained in this article
are derived from the following sources:
FUTrrE rs INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION (FIA) INT'L REPORT, INTERNATIONAL VOLUME AND OPEN
INTEREST REPORT (1986-1995).
COMMODrrY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF DERIVATIVE
MARKETS, PRODUcrS AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES (1996)[hereinafter Collated Summary].
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, EMERGING MARKET DATABASE (1996).
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, A STUDY OF THE GLOBAL COMPETrrIvENEss OF
U.S. FUTrES MAR s (April 1994)[hereinafter Competitiveness Study].
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Terminborse (DTB) and the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), and
the Euroyen, which is traded on the Tokyo International Financial Fu-
tures Exchange (TIFFE), SIMEX and CME. Many of the world com-
modities such as metals, grains, coffee and oil similarly trade on
markets in many different jurisdictions.
At the same time that markets attracting international investor
interest are becoming more dispersed geographically and increasingly
offering similar or related products, risk is being concentrated in fewer
financial intermediaries and market users. Competitive forces and
the changing business climate are leading to a consolidation in the
number of firms providing an intermediation service for futures trans-
actions. This trend has been accompanied by the market dominance
of institutional investors who have the means and the capital to access
international markets.
These increasing linkages between the world's financial markets
and market participants and their implications for systemic risk have
been recognized and commented on at the highest levels of govern-
ment. At their recent 22nd annual meeting, the leaders of the G7
countries in their communique noted the opportunities and challenges
presented by the increased integration of global capital markets.
They endorsed the implementation of improved practical measures to
deal with risks posed by the operation of global financial markets, in-
cluding enhancing cooperation among international financial regula-
tory authorities, promoting stronger risk management and improving
transparency in market operations. They particularly encouraged the
adoption of strong prudential standards in emerging economies and
encouraged all relevant bodies to increase efforts to promote effective
supervisory structures in these economies.4
I. REGULATORY HARMONIZATION VS. REGULATORY
COMPETITION: How BEST TO ENHANCE REGULATORY
PROTECTIONS IN GLOBAL FUTURES MARKET
The proliferation of futures markets raises important questions
concerning the structure of international regulatory systems intended
to safeguard those markets. Although international regulators can
usually agree on the basic goals and objectives of regulation, there
exists fundamental differences in the regulatory approach taken, in-
3 See G7 ECONOMIC COMMUNIQUE, MAKING A SUCCESS OF GLOBALIZATION FOR THE BEN-
EFIT OF ALL (June 28, 1996)[hereinafter Lyon Communique]. The G7 countries are Canada,
Italy, France, Germany, Japan, the United States, and United Kingdom.
4 Id. at §§10-12.
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cluding the form and content of regulation. Should such systems be
harmonized to ensure uniformity of regulatory protection and to pre-
vent the competition for market share resulting in the lowest common
denominator of regulation, in effect, causing a race to the bottom?
Or, should diversity among international systems be accepted and, in-
deed, encouraged to ensure that regulation, in addition to being re-
sponsible, is innovative and responsive to different and evolving
market and business conditions?
Markets and regulators alike are well aware of the consequences
of reputational damage and the difficulty of restoring confidence after
a market or regulatory failure. The recent suspension by the Philip-
pine Securities and Exchange Commission of the registration of the
Manila International Futures Exchange (MIFE) based on findings of
massive fraud perpetrated on customers will cause customers to be
wary about re-entering the market, if and when it reopens.5 A less
dramatic example, but one with far reaching consequences to this day6
is the tin crisis of 1985. Because it occurred coincident with the imple-
mentation of the U.K. Financial Services Act 1986, the LME had little
option but to restructure as a U.K. Recognised Investment Exchange
(RIE). It also had to join, for the first time, the U.K. clearing house,
at that time the International Commodity Clearing House, now
known as the London Clearing House (LCH). Indeed, as this article
will later highlight, events have proven that no system, however well-
established, is immune from real or perceived regulatory failures or
failings.
Although concerned with reputational risk, national policy mak-
ers and market developers may well put a higher priority on launching
a market or product "on schedule," than on providing a robust regula-
tory system. Thus, in the race to become the first exchange to intro-
duce a product, many emerging markets and their regulators find
themselves in the unenviable position of choosing between:
reputational risk, a potential consequence of accelerating the com-
mencement of market operations with an underdeveloped or inade-
quate financial infrastructure, ranging from regulatory concerns such
as proper accounting standards and banking systems to support such
S SEC Closes MIFE, BusINEsS WORLD, June 24, 1996.
6 Following the Sumitomo disclosure and in view of the many unique features of metals
trading on the LME, the Exchange was the subject of a review by its oversight authority, the UK
Securities and Investments Board (SIB), which issued a Consultative Document seeking public
comment on the adequacy of the current regulatory arrangement. UK SIB, A REvmw OF THE
METALS MARET (August 15, 1996)[hereinafter LME Review].
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operations to technological considerations impacting on their opera-
tional capacity, such as a viable telecommunications system, and
* market share risk, the concern other more mature liquid markets or
less prudent jurisdictions, particularly those in the same time zone,
will initiate trading in that contract and volume may never migrate
back home.
7
Mature market jurisdictions face equally complex issues in
launching market and product innovations with previously unknown
systemic and other risk attributes. If regulators are perceived as too
cautious, they may be accused of not providing a level playing field on
which their regulated markets and firms can compete with other
global markets or global firms.
8
The view often is advanced that harmonization or standardization
of regulatory requirements would enhance protection and level the
global playing field in the competition for market share and customer
business. Those who favor regulatory competition wonder instead
whether harmonization could lead to inefficient, ineffective and costly
regulation without any corresponding regulatory benefit. This article
offers a regulatory practitioner's view that the effective regulation of
international markets and market participants need not be framed as
a stark choice between regulatory harmonization and regulatory
competition.'
Described below is the diversity of major international ap-
proaches in effect today, including their scope, content and implemen-
tation. This article not only highlights the complexities of achieving
harmonization but also questions whether harmonization would be
desirable. Among other reasons, in view of fundamental differences
in the legal, cultural and business conditions of different jurisdictions,
no one system is likely to work across all jurisdictions. Moreover,
very different approaches can lead to equally successful results. It fur-
ther notes that a byproduct of competition, regulatory diversity, pro-
vides the basis for regulatory "benchmarking" and facilitates the
development of more innovative, efficient and less costly regulations.
7 Merton H. Miller, International Competitiveness of U.S. Futures Exchanges, 4 J. Fmn. SERV.
REs. 387, 389 (1990).
8 Pat Arbor, chairman of the CBOT recently stated, "The United States futures industry is
not afraid of competition. We welcome it. We just don't think we should have one hand tied
behind our back while we compete." Pat Arbor, Mission Impossible?, FUTURES AND OMroNs
WoRLD, August 1996, at 5.
9 See Larry White, Competition versus Harmonization -An Overview of International Regu-
lation of Financial Services, INTERNATrONAL FINA'CiAL MARKErS 6 (Claude E. Barfield ed.,
1996).
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However, even diversity must have its limits. In an increasingly
integrated global marketplace, the consequences of a major regulatory
failure may be too costly to endorse differing regulatory approaches
which do not have as a minimum the achievement of certain agreed
principles, standards and practices. This article will note some major
trends in the evolution of regulation of global markets which help ex-
plain why regulatory diversity is evolving within the framework of
agreed "rules of the game" and provide support for the view that ex-
isting regulatory regimes are converging towards internationally ac-
cepted standards of regulation.
Ultimately, risk cannot be regulated out of the system and the
challenge for national policy makers and regulators is to achieve a bal-
ance between prudent regulation and acceptable levels of risk that is
appropriate for their jurisdiction.
II. REGULATORY DIVERSrFY
The basic aim of all derivatives regulation is to control the risks
associated with the regulated conduct. In the case of exchange-traded
futures transactions, those risks include systemic risk, market risk,
broker risk and client risk,'0 which are addressed by rules governing
market integrity and efficiency, financial safety and integrity and
fairness."
A review of current regulatory systems reveals deep philosophi-
cal differences in approaches to regulation and indeed there is no pre-
ferred regulatory approach or any system which is universally
acknowledged as encompassing the best approach.
12
10 Phillip A. Thorpe, Regulation of Futures Markets in the United Kingdom, in REGULATiNG
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETs: IssuEs AND POLICIES 151,169 (Franklin R. Edwards and
Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1992).
11 See, e-g., Collated Summary, supra note 2, at 3. Collated Summary was originally pub-
lished as a document of the Technical Committee (TC) of the International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) in June 1990. Since that date, the document has been updated
on an annual basis by the CFTC.
IOSCO's TC consists of securities and derivatives regulators from over 70 jurisdictions. It
was created in May 1987 to review regulatory problems related to international security transac-
tions and to propose practical solutions to these problems. Current members include regulatory
authorities from Australia, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands,
Ontario, Quebec, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.
12 See Collated Summary, supra note 2, at 2.
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A. Philosophical Differences
Philosophical differences in approaches to regulation involve sev-
eral fundamental issues: to whom do the regulations apply, which
rules apply and when do they apply?
Some jurisdictions cast a wide net, mandating that every act or
transaction which involves "conduct in" or "contact with" that juris-
diction, whether territorial or with their residents and citizens, falls
within their regulatory jurisdiction. In the scope and implementation
of their regulatory and enforcement powers, such systems generally
have decided not to be constrained by sovereignty or resource consid-
erations,'13 nor does it matter that the transaction at issue was "solic-
ited" or "unsolicited." Other jurisdictions, to a significant degree, rely
on territorial distinctions in determining which of their rules will apply
and to whom. In some jurisdictions, residents who on an unsolicited
basis engage in investment business with a firm in another jurisdiction
are presumed to have accepted the risk of such transactions, and they
are not afforded the protection of their jurisdictions' regulatory sys-
tems. The Investment Services Directive (ISD) of the European
Community (EC) and its home/host state distinctions as to which ju-
risdiction's laws will apply is another example of how regulatory re-
gimes deal with territorial concerns.
14
Another area where significant differences occur is the extent to
which regulatory authorities distinguish between different types of
customers in the application of their regulatory regimes. In some ju-
risdictions, the rules intended to address "fairness" or conduct of busi-
ness-including disclosure, best execution, account documentation
such as confirmation statements and monthly reports and, in some
cases, protection of client assets-do not apply at all or only in part to
professional or sophisticated customers, or they permit customers to
13 Judicial requirements, however, may impede them in their assertion of jurisdiction in
enforcement proceedings. See Collated Summary, supra note 2, at 60-71.
14 EC member states are Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lux-
embourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom.
Under the ISD, a firm's home state is the state in which it has its head office and registered
office, and whose authorities have granted it an authorization to do business covered by the ISD.
A firm's host state is any other state within the EC in which it carries on business covered by its
ISD authorization. The basic principle is of home state supervision with the: (1) home member
state authorities being responsible for authorization and prudential supervision throughout the
EC (including fit and proper requirements (eg., internal systems and controls), financial re-
sources and client assets); and (2) host member state authorities responsible for establishing and
enforcement of conduct of business rules. See UK SIB, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INVESTMENT
SERVICES DmncnvE AND CAPrrAL ADEaUACY DmEcm'E (July 1994).
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opt out of such protection.15 This approach is based on the view that
such customers have sufficient knowledge of financial instruments
and/or financial resources to enable them to make an informed assess-
ment of the risks involved. Other jurisdictions do not make such dis-
tinctions in the application of their fairness rules and generally require
that the full panoply of their rules apply equally to all customers.'6
Although this article does not focus on the off-exchange trading
of derivatives, this is another area of major difference among jurisdic-
tions. Some jurisdictions believe that subject to certain narrowly de-
fined exemptions or safe harbors, in general, all transactions in futures
must be done on an organized, licensed or authorized exchange, in
essence, providing an exchange monopoly.17 When imposed, this re-
quirement is intended to ensure that the markets operate to accepta-
ble standards in matters such as ensuring open and competitive
trading, providing continuous markets, protecting against
counterparty risk and enhancing transparency through public price
dissemination.
Other jurisdictions do not require that all transactions involving
derivatives occur on an organized exchange, and still others require
they occur on an exchange only when such transactions involve public
or retail customers. In many jurisdictions, the rules are silent on the
legal status of such transactions. Whether transactions in derivatives
must be executed on organized exchanges or not may influence which
regulatory measures are employed to address market integrity and ef-
ficiency concerns.
B. Market Integrity and Efficiency
The fundamental purpose of a derivative product is to shift risk.
When these products trade on an organized exchange, the markets on
which they trade serve another important function-the forces of sup-
15 The United Kingdom is one major market jurisdiction which systematically distinguishes
between sophisticated and unsophisticated customers in the application of its regulatory system.
U.K. conduct of business rules differentiate between "private customers" and "non-private cus-
tomers." Collated Summary, supra note 2, at 76.
16 Id. at 77.
17 PHILIP McBRIDE J01HNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COMMODITIES REGULATION 253 (2d
ed. 1989). It should be noted, however, that the Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, § 502,
106 Stat. 3590 (1992) (amending § 4(a) of the Commodities Exchange Act (CEA), 7 U.S.C.
§ 6(a), and adding § 4(c)(1), 7 U.S.C. § 6(c)(1), authorizes the CFrC to exempt any agreement,
contract or transaction that is otherwise subject to the exchange-trading requirement of § 4(a)).
Although the CFTC has adopted a limited pilot program to exempt so-called professional mar-
kets from certain CFTC rules otherwise applicable to exchange markets, no exchange has filed
for relief under the program. 60 Fed. Reg. 51,323 (1995).
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ply and demand in this central forum assist in price discovery in the
underlying cash commodity by publicly forecasting traders' future ex-
pectations of the price of that commodity. If the design of products
traded on the market makes them readily susceptible to manipulation,
or if as a result of inadequate surveillance and monitoring, prices on
the market can be manipulated, or trading practices are such that a
few can benefit at the expense of others, traders will lose confidence
in the integrity of the marketplace.
For these reasons, market integrity concerns are central to regula-
tory programs related to organized futures and options markets.
Therefore, most jurisdictions require that futures markets, including
the arrangements for the clearance and settlement of contracts, and
products be "recognized" or authorized.
The measures used to detect and deter market situations condu-
cive to possible price distortion and abusive trading practices and to
limit the adverse effects of market volatility, however, vary from juris-
diction to jurisdiction. These measures include:
" position limits, which restrict the number of positions in a particular
contract that one person can control;
18
" large trader reporting, which requires the reporting to regulators by
traders who control more than a certain number of positions;
19
• front-running restrictions, which prohibit brokers from trading ahead
of their customers;
" audit trail requirements, which permit the reconstruction of trades and
transactions necessary to allow detection and proof of possible abuses;
18 In the United States, such limits are intended to prevent market disruptions. In other
jurisdictions, such limits are imposed principally to limit a firm's exposure to a single customer
involving a single commodity and not to prevent market manipulation.
19 CFTC rules require brokers to report the daily futures and options positions of any trader
that owns or controls a position in any delivery month of a commodity that equals or exceeds
specified reporting levels. The firm also must identify the persons who own or control those
reportable positions by name and address. The CFTC also may make special calls on FCMs and
foreign brokers carrying accounts for traders with large positions.
Information from the CFrC's large trader data base was invaluable during the market crisis
of 1987, the failure of Barings in quickly confirming that the positions of Barings and its related
entities on US markets was de minimis, and during the recent Sumitomo crisis in confirming that
Sumitomo Corporation had no reportable positions on any US market. Although conceived as a
market surveillance tool and in reconstructing market activities, the large trader reporting sys-
tem is equally important from a systemic risk perspective in monitoring market conditions and
the financial and operational viability of relevant firms. See U.S. TREAS., REPORT OF THE PRESI-
DETIMAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS (1988)[hereinafter Brady Report].
Although most foreign regulatory authorities have the ability to request information from
markets and traders subject to their jurisdiction, and some foreign markets require that their
members report the identity of customer and firm position which are at reportable levels, no
other major market jurisdiction requires the routine reporting of large positions, either by trad-
ers or by brokers to relevant regulatory authorities.
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" transparency requirements, that is, the public dissemination of price
and volume;
20
" listing or contract design standards, including restrictions on which
products can be the subject of secondary trading and specifications or
procedures for contracts providing for physical delivery of an underly-
ing commodity, to ensure that proposed terms and conditions do not
have deficiencies that could increase the likelihood of cash, futures, or
option market disruptions and undermine the usefulness and effi-
ciency of a market;2 ' and
" price limits, circuit breakers and/or trading halts, changes in trading
hours, changes in settlement times or payment means or manner of
calculating settlement-prices, to minimize the adverse effects of unu-
sual market volatility.
As noted above, although all regulatory systems have rules regarding
the maintenance of fair and orderly markets, they vary significantly in
the degree to which they rely on some or any of the specific measures
listed above to achieve such goals. In most jurisdictions, decisions re-
garding which, if any, of these measures to implement are left to the
discretion of the exchange, without any prior approval, implicit or ex-
press, required by the regulatory authority. In other jurisdictions,
some or all of the measures noted above may be the subject of express
regulatory rules established by the governmental authority.
The reason for this variance may rest, in part, on the perceived
role or purpose of the market in that jurisdiction, as illustrated by a
comparison of the U.S. and U.K. perspectives. 23 In the U.S. statutory
20 Most futures and option exchanges provide post-trade price and volume information on a
real-time basis to quote vendors (although this may not be required).
The EC's ISD contains transparency requirements (in addition to recordkeeping require-
ments) applicable to all EC member states. Price and volume information must be published at
the beginning of every day, every hour and every twenty minutes. Information about quotes
must be available during all periods the market is open. Ruben Lee, Supervising EU Capital
Markets: Do We Need a European SEC?, in EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND BusINEss LAW 187,190
(Buxbaum, Hertig eds., 1996).
21 An October 1992 IOSCO paper reflected international consensus that exchanges and reg-
ulators should take into account certain specified criteria relevant to the underlying index in
designing or reviewing a derivative product based on a stock index. These criteria are: (1) the
method of calculation; (2) the number of component stocks; (3) the liquidity of component
stocks; (4) the dispersion of component stocks; (5) the replacement of component stocks; and (6)
the selection of component stocks' clearance and settlement. See IOSCO TECHNICAL COMMrr-
TEE, REPORT ON CONTRACT DEsIGN AND MEAsURES TO MNrtIzE MARKET DISRUPTION, at 2
(Oct. 1992).
22 See IOSCO TECHNICAL COMmrITrEE, MEcHANIsMS TO ENHANCE OPEN AND TIMELY
COMMUNICATION BETWEEN MARKET AUTHORmTEs oF RELATED CASH AND DERIVATIVE MAR-
KErs DURING PERIODS OF MARKET DISRUPTION, at 11-12 (Oct. 1993).
23 The approaches implemented by the United States and United Kingdom, which regulate
among the most active international futures markets, are frequently referred to in this article for
comparative purposes.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 17:242 (1996)
framework, the commercial aspects of futures trading and markets im-
plicitly take a secondary role to the public interest, public purpose
function they provide relative to hedging against price risk, price dis-
covery and the actual pricing of commercial commodity transactions.24
Although the exchanges are commercial concerns, they are vested by
statute with quasi-governmental responsibilities as self-regulatory or-
ganizations (SRO) with the duty to police their members and are ac-
countable to their regulatory oversight authority, the CFTC, for
compliance with all of their rules.
Under the U.K. system, the Financial Services Act of 1986 (FSA)
specifically does not impose self-regulatory obligations on the mar-
kets, recognizing that the London markets evolved from and remain
today essentially commercial and user markets.-5 The FSA instead
focuses on the protection of the retail investor.26 Additionally, the
FSA has among its objectives, the promotion of the competitiveness
and the avoidance of protectionism for the industry it regulates, in-
cluding futures exchanges.27
C. Financial Integrity Regime
A distinct feature of most organized futures exchanges is that
credit risk between the ultimate counterparties (iLe., clearing mem-
bers) is eliminated through the process of novation.28 In this setting,
24 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 17, at 261 (citing 7 U.S.C. §§5, 6(b), (c), (h)).
25 See Thorpe, supra note 10, at 161.
26 Id. at 161.
27 AND.REw LARGE, FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATION - MAKING THE Two TIER SYSTEM
WoRK, at 20-21 (SIB, May 1993) [hereinafter Large Report].
It should be noted, however, that the 1992 CFTC reauthorization legislation, the Futures
Practices Trading Act of 1992 (FPTA), See discussion infra 36-38, provided for a study by the
CFTC of the global competitiveness of U.S. futures markets, resulting in the 1993 Competitive-
ness Study.
In addition, the Chairman and ranking minority member of the Senate Committee on Agri-
culture, Nutrition, and Forestry issued a joint statement outlining their planned legislative re-
forms updating the CEA in which they noted:
There is a public interest in a strong, competitive U.S. futures industry because of its critical
role in price discovery and business risk management. This public interest implies, and re-
quires, a degree of regulation. In recent years, U.S. futures exchanges have also faced in-
creasing competition from foreign exchanges and from over-the-counter derivative
products. U.S. exchanges face some regulatory costs that are not borne by their competi-
tors. The [CEA], and the [CFTC's] actions to implement its requirements, must strike an
appropriate balance between prudent regulation and the need for a cost-competitive
industry.
Reforming and Updating the Commodity Exchange Act Outline of Planned Legislation (joint
statement of Sen. Lugar and Sen. Leahy, Sen. Com. on Ag., Nutrition and Forestry, Aug. 1996).
2-8 This term refers to the legal substitution of a new party and discharge of one of the origi-
nal parties to a contract by agreement of all three parties. A new contract is created with the
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the exchange/clearing house2 9 becomes the buyer to every seller and
the seller to every buyer.
The exchange minimizes its exposure to its members by marking
all positions to the market on a daily basis and settling all trades
through pays and collects.30 The clearing house collects variation
margin from the losing side of trades and pays the gaining side of
trades on the exchange. If a clearing member is unable to pay the
variation margin and defaults, the clearing house guarantees perform-
ance on the contract.
Consequently, prudential or financial resource requirements are
a key component of all futures market regulations. Such requirements
serve to protect markets, firms and customers from default and sys-
temic risk by ensuring that only those who are creditworthy and have
a stake in the proper conduct of business have access to markets and
to customers funds.
The following key components of financial integrity are discussed
below: (1) financial resource requirements; (2) clearance and settle-
ment of trades; (3) margin and credit extension; and (4) protection of
clients assets and insolvency.
1. Financial Resource Requirements
Although financial resource requirements for intermediaries are
in effect in all jurisdictions and in most cases are based on a measure
of increased or decreased liabilities or volume of business, there are
jurisdictional differences as to the level of required capital, the man-
same terms as the original one but only the parties are changed. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS
§§ 423-430 (1932).
29 A clearing house may be organized as a division of an exchange (TIFFE and CME are
examples), may be affiliated with but separately incorporated from the exchange for which it
clears trades (CBOT and the Board of Trade Clearing Corporation, which clears trades for the
CBOT, is an example), or may have contractual and other obligations to clear trades for an
exchange but no other legal affiliation with that exchange (the relationship between LCH and
various U.K. exchanges prior to the reorganization of LCH on October 9, 1996 is an example).
See infra note 36.
30 Generally, clearing organizations collect "original" and "variation" margin payments from
their clearing members. "Initial" and "maintenance" margins are required by brokers from their
customers. Original margin is an initial performance bond required to be deposited by the clear-
ing firm that has presented a futures contract for clearance.
In addition to making daily original margin computations, the clearing organization calcu-
lates variation margin requirements, representing daily profits or losses on the futures contracts
carried by the clearing firm. Based upon these daily mark-to-market computations, the clearing
organizations issue variation margin calls or makes variation payments, which are also referred
to as daily "pays" and "collects" to its clearing members. Competitiveness Study, supra note 2,
at 37 n.25. See also Collated Summary, supra note 2, at 124-148.
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ner of its computation and what constitutes good capital for calcula-
tion purposes. Many of these differences have material consequences
for the cost of doing business.
In computing capital requirements, 31 most jurisdictions' require-
ments are based on a measure of increased or decreased liabilities or
volume of business and have a base threshold requirement below
which capital may not fall. In the United States, capital increases with
increased amounts of customer funds held by the firm. In the United
Kingdom, that reference point is the higher of a percentage of the
previous year's expenditure or initial margin (a lower amount under
any definition than customer funds). In some jurisdictions, generally
those with universal banking systems 32 like Germany and France, the
thresholds are set so high that the requirements are fixed at such
thresholds.33 One jurisdiction, Japan, starts with a very high threshold
level and increases the requirement on risk-based and concentration
considerations.34
In general, acceptable regulatory capital in all jurisdictions for
brokers is comprised of current or liquid assets.35 Letters of credit
31 "Adjusted net capital" is a measure of liquidity and equals "net capital" (current assets
minus liabilities) minus various charges or adjustments.
32 In such jurisdictions, banks are permitted to engage directly (rather than through subsidi-
aries or bank holding company affiliates) in a broad range of financial services activities, includ-
ing brokerage activities.
33 The Capital Adequacy Directive of the European Community (CAD), however, has a
fixed capital requirement of US$ 203,000 and does not increase or decrease based on volume of
business or risk undertaken. Competitiveness Study, supra note 2, at 50 n.41. The CAD estab-
lishes minimum standards, and most EC members require much higher levels of capital. Direc-
tive on the Capital Adequacy of Investment Firms and Credit Institutions, Council Directive 90/
141 of 23 May 1990; Council Directive 92/13 of 27 January 1992.
34 "[T]he base minimum net capital requirement for a U.S. futures commission merchant
(FCM) which carries customer accounts and the U.S. dollar equivalent for similar firms doing
business in the following foreign jurisdictions" are:
Jurisdiction (Minimum Required Capital)
1. United States ($250,000)
2. Singapore ($150,000)
3. United Kingdom ($155,000)
4. European Community ($203,000)
5. Germany ($168 million for general clearing member, $16.8 million for direct clearing
member, only credit institutions within the meaning of § 1 of the banking act can be
clearing members)
6. Japan ($2.77 million)
7. France ($147,375,000 for general clearing member of Matif, $39,300,000 for individual
clearing member of Matif; $1,492,500 for all other brokers)
See Competitiveness Study, supra note 2, at 50 n.41; Collated Summary, supra note 2, at 93-102.
U.S. dollar equivalents calculated on Aug. 22, 1996 (WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 1996, at B4).
35 The value of the asset which may be included in the capital computation varies from juris-
diction to jurisdiction. For example, U.S. capital rules require that FCMs and broker-dealers
subject to regulation by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) apply a 30% hair-
cut (a percentage discount applied to the current market value of the security based on risk
Regulation of Global Futures Markets
17:242 (1996)
may not be counted as capital, although in certain jurisdictions, bank
guarantees can be treated as good capital. Subject to certain condi-
tions, most jurisdictions permit subordinated loans36 to be considered
as good capital. In some jurisdictions there is an additional charge for
concentrated positions related to a percentage of capital.
2. Clearance and Settlement
As clearing houses maintain a perfectly matched book and there-
fore should be insulated from market risk, counterparty risk is not
usually considered a significant risk element of exchange traded fu-
tures. Nonetheless, Barings most recently demonstrated that clearing
houses remain exposed to the counterparty risk of their clearing mem-
bers and, similarly, clearing members and their customers are still ex-
posed to counterparty and settlement risks. Specifically, Barings also
revealed that the manner in which the clearing guarantee operates
varies widely, heightening trader's awareness that in some cases the
clearing guarantee may not be a guarantee at all.
If the margin or performance bond posted by a member is insuffi-
cient to cover the member's losses, clearing houses use various means
to ensure performance on the contract. In the United States, most
clearing houses have guaranty funds consisting of member contribu-
tions, and in the event the member's contribution or the entire guar-
anty fund is inadequate, most exchanges have the ability to assess
members to make up the shortfall. In the United Kingdom, the newly
re-organized member and exchange-owned London Clearing House
similarly has a Member Default Fund, supplemented by private de-
fault insurance coverage but has no automatic ability to make further
assessments on members.37 In France, the ultimate guaranty is pro-
factors) to equities or if they elect the alternative treatment, a 15% haircut. Under the alterna-
tive treatment, the firm must meet a higher base minimum net capital requirement to qualify for
the 15%. The base haircut in Japan is 30%. See Collated Summary, supra note 2, at 100-101.
36 A subordinated loan agreement involves a lender providing a broker with cash, or with a
secured demand note collateralized by the lender's pledge of securities or cash. See generally
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Form 1-FR-FCM Instructions 5-7 (July 1989). In or-
der for the firm to be able to count the subordinated loan as good capital, it must satisfy the rules
governing what constitutes a proper subordination agreement in effect in the relevant
jurisdiction.
37 Prior to its reorganization on October 9,1996, the LCH which clears for LIFFE, LME and
the International Petroleum Exchange in the United Kingdom, was owned by six shareholder
banks who provided the clearing guaranty: Barclays, Lloyds, Midland, National Westminster,
Royal Bank of Scotland, and Standard Chartered. Placing Memorandum: Proposals for
Changes in the Ownership, Capital Structure and Financial Backing Arrangements Involving a
Private Placing for The London Clearing House Limited (N.M. Rothschild & Sons Ltd.), July
1996, at 2.
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vided by the Banque de France. Currently, none of the European fu-
tures clearing houses have express assessment powers.3
Although most jurisdictions mark exchange positions to market
daily, not all clearing houses settle the gains and losses on a daily ba-
sis. At least one exchange, the LME, does not collect initial or main-
tenance margin or transfer gains or losses until the positions are
closed out on the prompt (i.e., final settlement) date. In Japan,
although variation gains are credited to the account and losses are
collected, the profits may not be withdrawn (although a percentage
may be used to margin new positions) until the position is closed out.
3. Margin and Credit Extension
Performance bond (margin) requirements generally are set by the
relevant exchange and, in many jurisdictions, are subject to some form
of regulatory oversight. Clearing houses' margin calculation systems
fall into one of two categories: (1) risk-based margin systems, such as
"SPAN" (used by certain futures exchanges in the United States,
United Kingdom, Japan, and Singapore) or "TIMS" (used by certain
exchanges in Canada, Germany, Hong Kong, Netherlands and the
United States);39 and (2) margining based on a fixed percentage of
contract values, used by many markets in the Pacific Rim.4° The defi-
nition of good collateral varies among jurisdictions. Practice among
clearing houses or exchanges varies as to whether letters of credit, eq-
uity securities or guarantees are acceptable as margin. A financial in-
termediary may accept different types of collateral from that accepted
by the relevant clearing house or exchange and may also require
higher levels of margin from its customers.
'Although variation margin ordinarily is collected on a net basis,
exchanges/clearing houses-vary in whether they collect original margin
on a gross or net basis. Under a net clearing system, original margin is
posted by clearing firms based upon the net positions in their ac-
38 MOODYS GLOBAL CREDIT RESEARCH GROUP, CREDIT RIsKS OF CLEARING HousES AT
FuruRs AND OMPONS EXCHANGES 230 (June 1995).
39 Id. at 226. Standard Portfolio Analysis of Risk (SPAN) and Theoretical Intermarket Mar-
gins Systems (TIMS) are risk-based margin systems. SPAN, for example, margins option and
futures positions in the same account on a portfolio basis, measuring the aggregate risk of the
combined positions. The key element of SPAN is the "scanning risk charge" which is deter-
mined by calculating what a portfolio's gain or loss in value would be as a result of various
changes in the underlying futures price, rate of volatility, and time to option expiration. This
charge is set equal to the greatest potential loss resulting form these calculations. Memorandum
regarding the Chicago Mercantile Exchange Proposed Dollars at Risk Option Margin System
(Nov. 1988)(on file with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission).
40 Id.
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counts, reflecting an offset of long and short positions in the same
futures contract. In a gross margining system, the offsetting long and
short positions are each margined separately.4'
4. Protection of Customer Assets and Insolvency
All jurisdictions require that intermediary firms maintain records
distinguishing their funds from those of their customers, and most ju-
risdictions have some requirements relating to protection of custom-
ers' assets ranging from insurance or contingency funds, to the
physical segregation of customer funds from those of the firm. In ju-
risdictions with a segregation requirement, the calculation of what
must be segregated and for whom differs from jurisdiction to jurisdic-
tion. In some cases segregation may be required of brokers but not of
the ultimate custodian, the exchange/clearing house.
In universal banking jurisdictions such as Germany, Japan and
the United Kingdom, the concept of segregation with respect to cash
held by a bank/broker dealer may be inapplicable under relevant bank
insolvency rules, all customers of the bank (irrespective of their status
as a bank or brokerage customer) will claim their pro-rata share of the
remaining assets of the bank. However, specifically identifiable assets
of the customer held by the failed bank/broker in trust will be re-
turned to that customer.42 France is unique among universal bank ju-
risdictions in providing a Banque de France guarantee for all
obligations of clearing members to their customers for transactions on
organized French exchanges. Most jurisdictions also have require-
ments governing the location of customer funds and the manner of
their investment.
These protections are intended to guard against the misappropri-
ation of funds, to facilitate the transfer of positions following a firm's
41 Whether a net or gross margining system is used varies across jurisdictions and even
within different markets in the same jurisdiction (France and the United States are examples, in
this regard). If segregation is required by the exchange/clearing house, offsetting between the
clearing member's customers' account and its house account is not permitted, even in a net
margining system.
42 See, &g., FIA Global Task Force Survey on Exchanges and Clearing Houses Responses on
Financial Integrity Issues (1995)(on file with author). The FIA Global Task Force on Financial
Integrity was formed in response to industry concerns relevant to the Barings failure. It con-
sisted of industry representatives from 17 jurisdictions. The FIA is a U.S.-based international
association which acts as a principal spokesman for the futures and options industry. It ceased
operation in June 1996.
Under the CEA, CFTC rule 190.10(c), 17 C.F.R. § 190.10(c), requires express disclosure to
customers that non-cash margin deposited as collateral will receive no more protection than cash
in the event of an FCM's insolvency.
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financial crisis and to accord special treatment to customer funds
when the financial intermediary becomes insolvent. The absence of
segregation between firm and customer assets at the firm and clearing
house levels can complicate and delay the transfer of non-defaulting
customers' positions and other assets to solvent firms in the event of a
firm default.43 A firm may default when it has inadequate resources
to satisfy its obligations to the clearing house. If such a firm was trad-
ing both for its own account and on behalf of customers, and assets
had been commingled at the exchange/clearing house level, custom-
ers' funds might be used to finance proprietary positions of the firm
(as occurred in Barings).
Although it is unlikely the Barings experience will result in the
universal implementation of segregation, it has made regulators and
market operators aware of the need to develop transparent policies
relative to default procedures and to inform market users of the finan-
cial protection in place.44 The other concern noted after the Barings
experience was the need for certainty that each jurisdictions' insol-
vency laws would support the enforceability of such arrangements.
D. Customer Protection / Fairness Regime
All regulatory systems impose rules and regulations intended to
ensure fairness and to detect and deter violative conduct by those do-
ing business with the trading public. In general, these internationally
accepted "conduct of business" principles can be summarized as re-
quiring firms to: (1) act with honesty and fairness in conducting their
business activities; (2) act with due skill, care and diligence; (3) have
and employ effectively the resources and procedures needed for the
proper performance of business activities; (4) seek from their custom-
ers information about their financial situation, investment experience
and investment objectives; (5) provide adequate disclosure of rele-
vant material information to customers; (6) avoid conflicts of interest
and, when they cannot be avoided, to ensure customers are treated
fairly; and (7) comply with all regulatory requirements applicable to
the conduct of their business activities so as to promote the best inter-
ests of customers and the integrity of the market.' As discussed
above, however, significant differences exist among jurisdictions in the
43 COMMODITY FuTuREs TRADING COMMISSION, DIsCUSSION PAPER ON DEFAULT PROCE-
DURES (May 1995).
44 See note 66, infra.
45 See IOSCO TECHNICAL COMMITrEE, REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL CoNDucr OF BusiNEss
RuLps 8-9 (July 1990).
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scope and implementation of these rules and whether the rules apply
to all or only certain customers.
1. Fitness and Qualification Standards for Authorization
Most jurisdictions have fitness requirements for financial in-
termediaries, which consider previous violative conduct, character and
competency. Jurisdictions vary, however in whether they require re-
gistration/authorization, perform fitness screening and test the trading
and regulatory knowledge of individual salespersons. Also, the scope
of the screening process with respect to firms and their principals vary
significantly. Only a few jurisdictions take affirmative steps to con-
firm the accuracy of the information provided by applicants by coop-
erating with police authorities such as Interpol and foreign regulatory
authorities to obtain fitness information on applicants.
2. Sales Practices and Disclosure
In addition to prohibiting misrepresentation and other fraudulent
conduct, nearly all jurisdictions have rules intended to ensure appro-
priate generic disclosures are made to customers about the risk of
trading in futures prior to such investing and further require that cus-
tomers acknowledge receipt of such disclosures.46 As noted above,
however, in some jurisdictions, these and other conduct of business
rules may not be applicable to sophisticated, informed investors.
3. Priority of Order Execution
Although most jurisdictions do not prohibit dual capacity trading
(i.e., the ability of industry professionals to trade for their own ac-
count and for customer accounts simultaneously), a "customer first"
rule generally is imposed when dual-capacity trading is permitted.
4. Recordkeeping and Reporting
Generally, jurisdictions require the creation and maintenance of
records, such as confirmations, with respect to the execution and fi-
nancial effect of exchange transactions. Jurisdictions differ as to the
46 In view of the similarity of many jurisdiction's required disclosure text, several interna-
tional regulators, including the CFTC, developed an agreed generic risk disclosure statement
intended to satisfy the risk disclosure requirements of multiple jurisdictions. To date, only the
CFTC, U.K. Securities and Futures Authority and the Central Bank of Ireland have adopted the
generic statement. See Risk Disclosure by Futures Commission Merchants, Introducing Brokers,
Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors to Customers, 59 Fed. Reg.
38,118 (1994).
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extent of the records and information which must be maintained or
made available to customers.
E. Compliance Monitoring Programs
Jurisdictions also differ in the structure of their regulatory over-
sight programs, which have a significant impact on the scope and
depth of their compliance monitoring programs. In many jurisdic-
tions, market and customer protection responsibilities are vested in
Ministerial level agencies which have a broad range of
macroeconomic responsibilities (such as revenue collection and for
setting tax and budget policies) and few resources for day-to-day fi-
nancial services regulatory activities. Other jurisdictions have special-
ized governmental agencies which oversee self-regulatory
organizations with statutory obligations to police themselves and their
members.
F. Observations
Regulators internationally may agree that customer protection
and market and financial integrity are the common objectives of regu-
lation. However, as the discussion above illustrates, they have very
different views on how best to achieve these objectives. Fundamental
differences exist among jurisdictions as to what they regulate, who
they regulate and how they regulate. These differences are mani-
fested in the scope and content of jurisdictions' rules as well as in the
scope and depth of their compliance monitoring programs. Although
some of the areas of differences are superficial, many are not and re-
flect the unique characteristics of each jurisdiction's legal, cultural and
business/market conditions.
For example, a statutory framework such as the United King-
dom's, which has as its focus the protection of the retail customer,
may elect, as a matter of policy, that the full scope of its conduct of
business rules need not apply to sophisticated institutional customers.
In other systems, customers, irrespective of their sophistication, will
not be permitted to opt out of the regulatory protections which the
regulatory authority has deemed to be vital.
III. TowARDs REGULATORY CONVERGENCE
Market and regulatory trends appear to indicate that market au-
thorities recognize that the consequences of a major regulatory failure
may be too costly to risk endorsing approaches which are not
anchored in certain internationally agreed principles, standards and
260
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practices. This section describes some significant trends in the evolu-
tion of approaches to the regulation of global markets:
" episodes of market failure leading to reform;
" international regulatory coordination, both bilateral and multilateral;
and
* market and other innovations, such as international market linkages
leading to arrangements for the allocation of supervisory
responsibilities.
These trends illustrate the event driven nature of regulatory
change and reform. Indeed, the shared experiences of similar or iden-
tical "disasters," the need to reach common understandings of risks
posed by innovations such as market linkages and the development by
IOSCO of international consensus on issues of common regulatory
concern explain why regulatory diversity is evolving within the frame-
work of agreed "rules of the game." They also provide support for the
view that existing regulatory regimes are converging towards interna-
tionally accepted standards of regulation.
A. Episodes of Market Failure Leading to Reform
Market or firm failures can result in loss of confidence in a mar-
ketplace, and the regulatory and self-regulatory responses to such fail-
ures are an indication of the importance exchanges and regulators
attach to maintaining or restoring a reputation for financial integrity.
As demonstrated by recent incidents involving Barings and
Sumitomo, episodes of market or firm failure inevitably lead to regu-
latory action.47
1. Barings Failure
The failure of Barings, a British merchant bank, was caused by a
cumulative loss of over £827 million on substantial proprietary posi-
tions entered into by a Barings trader based in Singapore on various
international futures markets.4 8 In May 1995 representatives of regu-
latory authorities in 16 countries responsible for supervising the activi-
ties of the world's major futures and options markets were invited by
the CFTC and SIB to discuss key issues resulting from the failure of
47 See generally Competitiveness Study, supra note 2, which also discusses the regulatory
responses following the 1985 tin crisis on the LME, the near default of the Hong Kong Futures
Exchange following the market crash of October 1987, the events leading to the issuance of the
U.K. Large Report and events addressed by the U.S. Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992
amending the CEA.
48 See BOARD OF BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK OF ENGLAND, INVESGATION INTO THE
FAILURE OF BARiNGS 232 (1995).
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Barings.49 In the ensuing Windsor Declaration, the authorities agreed
to a program of work to ensure that regulatory concerns in four areas
revealed by this failure were addressed:
* cooperation between market authorities,
* protection of customer positions, funds and assets,
* default procedures, and
* regulatory cooperation in emergencies.50
The Windsor Declaration contemplated work to be carried for-
ward both by the individual authorities who attended the meeting and
also on a broader multilateral basis through appropriate international
bodies, such as IOSCO.51
At the same time, the industry initiated an ambitious program of
work by markets, market members and market users. Separately, a
number of individual market authorities initiated their own regulatory
and procedural reviews in light of the Barings collapse.52 All of the
separate initiatives essentially reflect certain fundamental lessons rein-
forced by the Barings failure, and include:
* first, better mechanisms for sharing information related to large expo-
sures and for communication during emergencies among regulators
and market authorities were critically needed in order to reduce the
potential for disruptive market events and to manage such events and
their consequences appropriately should they materialize,
* second, that market users did not have adequate knowledge of the
scope and nature of existing market protection and procedures, in par-
ticular as to the treatment accorded their positions, funds and assets in
a worst case scenario, and that enhanced transparency could assist
them to act appropriately during a disruptive event, and
" third, the need for market authorities to agree and implement stan-
dards of best practice related to market default procedures and the
treatment of customer positions, funds and assets by markets and fi-
nancial intermediaries?5
49 See Windsor Declaration, May 1995 (on file with author). The meeting in Windsor was co-
chaired by the CFTC and SIB. Other participants included futures regulatory authorities from:
Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Singapore,
South Africa, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.
50 Id.
51 In July 1995, following the Windsor meeting, the Presidents Committee of IOSCO
adopted a resolution supporting further work by the IOSCO Technical Committee on post
Windsor issues.
52 This work was carried out by the FIA Global Task Force on Financial Integrity.
53 See Final Report from the Co-Chairmen of the May 1995 Windsor Meeting to the Techni-
cal Committee of IOSCO (August 1996) [hereinafter Windsor Report]. The report was dissemi-
nated during the XVII annual meeting of IOSCO in Montreal, Canada with the following
additional reports:
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The Final Report further identifies the following fundamental
changes which have been achieved:
" large exposure companion information sharing arrangements at the
regulator and market level, which are unique in that they are trigger-
based and permit an integrated multilateral assessment of market
risk,54
" the development of procedures to better coordinate and respond to a
market crisis once it has materialized,55
" initiatives to increase the transparency of market protection and pro-
cedures, including proposals for the strengthening of client asset
protection,
" initiatives intended to encourage the development of "best practices"
concerning market default procedures and the treatment of positions,
funds, and assets to contain systemic risks; and
" reviews by regulatory authorities of the situation in their domestic ju-
risdictions, leading to change in some cases.
These initiatives represented an unprecedented level of coopera-
tion between regulatory and market authorities to enhance market
and customer protection and minimize systemic risk.
2. Sumitomo Corporation
The events surrounding extreme volatility in the copper market
and the over $2 billion in copper trading losses sustained by Sumitomo
Corporation have resulted in the issuance by the SIB of a Consultative
Document on the LME seeking public views on a number of trading
practices and market regulations covering transactions in metal both
on the LME and over-the-counter.56 The SIB document seeks re-
- a compendium, prepared from reports by individual jurisdictions represented at Windsor, on
domestic work undertaken in the last year to implement Windsor recommendations;
- a summary by the IOSCO Secretary General of the IOSCO work, carried forward since the
last report in July 1995, to fulfil the remit from the Declaration which IOSCO agreed at Wind-
sor to complete; and
- a paper by the FIA Global Task Force on post-Barings initiatives that have been completed in
that group.
54 See IOSCO, DECLARATION ON COOPERATION AND SUPERVISION OF INTERNATIONAL Fu-
TURES EXCHANGES AND CLEARING ORGANIZATIONS (1996) [hereinafter Declaration]. The dec-
laration is an initiative of the Windsor Co-Chair and which was signed by 14- now 15-
jurisdictions at Boca Raton in Florida in March of 1996, and a companion Memorandum of
Understanding and Agreement which 49- now 54- international futures exchanges and clearing
organizations signed under the auspices of the FIA Global Task Force.
55 See IOSCO TECHNICAL COMMrrrEE, COOPERATION BETWEEN MARKET AuTHoRrrins
AND DEFAULT PROCEDURES (1996).
56 See LME Review, supra note 6. The actions of Sumitomo relevant to volatility in the
copper markets in late 1995 also are the subject of a cooperative investigative inquiry by the
CFTC and SIB. See COMMODITY FUTUREs TRADING COMMISSION, News Release No. 3918-96,
CFTC STATEMENT CONCERNING THE COPPER MARKET (June 14,1996); See also Sumitomo Cor-
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sponses on a number of detailed and technical issues with the aim of
ensuring that the regulation of the LME strikes an appropriate bal-
ance between competing issues, such as transparency and liquidity and
the needs of commercial users and other traders. The Sumitomo an-
nouncement also demonstrated that trading in physical delivery com-
modity markets can raise special market integrity and surveillance
concerns and may need to be the subject of further examination by
regulators of such markets. To that end, the CFTC, SIB and the Japa-
nese Ministry of International Trade and Industry co-sponsored an in-
ternational conference on November 25-26, 1996, to examine the
special market surveillance, contract specification and information
sharing issues raised by such markets.
In addition, market events such as Sumitomo and Barings can
raise questions relative to the efficient operation of existing mecha-
nisms to share information to address the effects of such events. The
CFTC and SIB therefore proposed, and IOSCO has approved a new
work mandate to particularize, for each type of market event, the
types of information which market and regulatory authorities may
need to share.
B. Market and Other Innovations
Another important trend is the competition among markets for
market share. This presents its own challenges for regulators. Mar-
kets have been innovative in their attempts to provide around-the-
clock access to their products whether via:
" international arrangements for the clearance of trades, either mutu-
ally, as in the case of the CME/SIMEX mutual offset system, or uni-
tary, where one exchange clears for the contracts of both linked
exchanges,
" dispersed screens, as in the case of the CME's GLOBEX trading
system,
" dispersed trading floors, as in the case of the New York Cotton Ex-
change's FINEX division's operating floor in Dublin, Ireland,
" electronic linkage arrangements with foreign exchanges, as in the case
of GLOBEX with Matif and NYMEX ACCESS with SYCOM, which
provides for cross-exchange access by the members of one exchange
to the products traded on the other, without having to become mem-
bers of the other exchange, or
• the linking of two exchanges' floor trading systems, that is, cross-ex-
change access not of two exchange's products trading side-by-side on
poration Press Statement (Sept. 19, 1996) (revising initial estimated loss of 1.8 billion to 2.6
billion dollars).
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the same electronic trading system but of two exchanges' trading
floors on a cross border basis, as is contemplated in the proposed link
between the CBOT and LIFFE.57
Innovations by markets58 also result in the development by in-
termediaries of innovative means of delivering services, which also
challenge the traditional approach to customer protection and the ap-
plication of conduct of business rules. In mature regulatory systems,
the statutes and rules generally did not contemplate dispersed 24-hour
markets. As a result traditional concerns regarding the need for regis-
tration and firm sponsorship of employees who engage in regulated
conduct frequently need to be reinterpreted to facilitate order flow
and to address access issues.
59
These market and firm innovations have the effect of enhancing
regulatory cooperation and coordination in that no regulator alone
will have the resources or capabilities to monitor all aspects of the
activities which may be subject to its requirements. In addition, com-
mon sense means that most linkage arrangements must be supported
by uniform or at least similar rules at cooperating exchanges.60 These
developments have caused the relevant regulators to identify the areas
of common concern and to allocate their supervisory responsibilities
efficiently to address both areas of regulatory gaps and duplication.
57 The initial filing was made in July 1995, and review of the project by Commission staff is
on hold at the request of the two exchanges.
58 By last count, there were eight linkage arrangements involving floor and electronic sys-
tems. See Laurie Morse, Strategic Alliances, Fur. IND. 10, 11 (May 1995).
59 See CFTC Interpretative Letter 92-11, [1990-1992 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 125,325 (June 25, 1992), and superseded in part by CFTC Interpretative Letter 93-83,
[1992-1994 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep (CCH) 25,849 (Aug. 9, 1993), addressing the
ability of members of the CME to pass the book of their customers' orders to their foreign
affiliates (who are not CFTC registered) with access to GLOBEX terminals to accept and enter
orders for CME contracts during hours when GLOBEX is operational; and CFTC Interpretative
Letter No. 93-1115,2 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 125,932 (Dec. 23,1993), facilitating order flow
relative to FCM's customers omnibus accounts carried by affiliated foreign brokers for execution
of foreign trades.
60 For example, CME Rule 575 implemented the MATIF/CME cross-exchange access propo-
sal. Rule 575.A. establishes the general requirements pursuant to which members of another
exchange participating in a cross-exchange access program with the CME could become eligible
to trade through GLOBEX in certain CME-listed contracts without becoming members of the
CME. Rule 575.B. establishes requirements by which CME members could trade through
GLOBEX in the contracts listed by another exchange participating in a cross-exchange access
program with the CME. In essence, the CME would adopt the trading rules of the foreign
exchange so that its members could access the contracts of the other exchange and vice versa
and each exchange would agree to monitor its members for compliance with the other ex-
change's trading rules.
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B. International Regulatory Coordination
1. Coordination Efforts
In a global marketplace, no one regulator will have access to all
the information or powers it needs to carry out its regulatory and en-
forcement powers. Even if it had the powers, it likely will not have
the resources to exercise them. Therefore, regulators increasingly co-
operate internationally on a bilateral and multilateral basis for a
broad range of purposes:
" investigatory and law enforcement purposes;
" to enhance the supervisory capacities of regulators charged with moni-
toring the activities of onshore firms and markets which may be im-
pacted by the activities of related offshore firms and markets, for
example, financial information sharing memoranda which provide for
the sharing of risk assessment information;
" to promote the efficient allocation of regulatory responsibilities when
one regulator has agreed to defer to the regulatory oversight activities
of another regulator whether in the context of linkage arrangements
between two markets or when registration and other rules are suffi-
ciently comparable to permit reliance on the other system; and
* to promote technical and other assistance in the development of a fi-
nancial infrastructure to siipport a market and other financial services
activities.
Judging by the number of arrangements which exist today, the
importance of such cooperative arrangements between relevant regu-
lators appears to be universally accepted.
61
2. IOSCO and BASLE
IOSCO's primary objective is to develop, on a global basis, high
standards of financial market regulation, minimize systemic risk and
facilitate cross border transactions. The main focus of its work is in
the following areas:
" promoting arrangements to improve cooperation and communication
flows between regulatory authorities,
" promoting the development of effective supervisory arrangements for
securities and derivatives firms and in particular for internationally ac-
tive and diversified financial groups,
" promoting measures to enhance the transparency, integrity and ro-
bustness of financial markets and market processes, and
61 See IOSCO, INDEX OF MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING AND SIMILAR AGREEMENTS
BETWEEN IOSCO MEMBERS (July 1996). The index documents approximately 465 agreements
in effect in 52 jurisdictions.
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* contributing to the fight against financial fraud and ensuring that the
regulatory system responds in a timely and effective manner to new
regulatory challenges. 2
Increasingly, IOSCO has been coordinating its efforts with BA-
SLE,63 and both organizations have resolved to work together actively
to promote the common goal of "improving the quality of supervision
worldwide and responding to financial market developments in a
timely, effective and efficient manner."64 In carrying out joint initia-
tives in areas such as internal controls and management, capital ade-
quacy, financial conglomerates and market emergencies, the two
groups have taken particular note of the evolving marketplace, the
risks associated with new trends in global trading and the need to de-
velop effective arrangements for supervising diversified financial
groups operating internationally.65
D. Observations
The discussion of market and regulatory developments illustrates
the event-driven nature of regulation. "Disasters" consistently show
that regulatory/market failures result in a loss of confidence in a mar-
ketplace. Regulators and market operators alike recognize that the
failure to implement prompt, effective measures to address a failure
can adversely affect the ability of their markets to weather the crisis
and continue to attract international business. Thus, market disasters
consistently have had the effect of prompting regulators to take meas-
ures to enhance existing protection. These events also have had the
collateral benefit of prompting similar enhancements by regulatory
authorities generally.
In addressing innovations by their internationally active markets
and firms to attract volume and customers in a 24-hour market envi-
ronment, affected regulatory authorities must achieve a common un-
derstanding of the risks raised by such proposals. These common
understandings of risk facilitate negotiations to allocate regulatory
62 See generally BASLE/IOSCO, RESPONSE OF THE BASLE CoMMrrEE ON BANFiNro SUPER-
VISION (BASLE) AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SEcURrrIES COMNUIISSIONS TO
THE REUEmST OF Tim G7 HEADS OF GoVERNMENT AT THE JUNE 1995 HALiFAX SuMrIT (May
1995) [hereinafter Joint Statement]; IOSCO, RESPONDING TO Tim CHALLENGE - SUPERviSiNG
GLOBAL FINANaCAL MARKETS (May 1995).
63 BASLE was established by the central bank Governors of the Group of Ten countries in
1975 and consists of senior representatives from banking supervisory authorities in Belgium,
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the
United States, and United Kingdom.
64 See Joint Statement, supra note 62.
65 Id.
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and/or SRO responsibilities to avoid regulatory gaps and to minimize
regulatory duplication. Thus, innovations will lead to the develop-
ment of consensus on new risk elements of market proposals, and the
resulting supervisory arrangements may enhance existing regulatory
protection.
Finally, the internationalization of the marketplace is also moti-
vating individual regulators through multilateral forums such as
IOSCO to establish minimum standards or develop consensus on a
broad range of issues of concern to derivatives (and securities) regula-
tors, including screen-based trading systems, internal controls, ex-
change default procedures and cross-border fraud. As market events
increasingly, almost inevitably, have international implications and ef-
fects, regulators increasingly are aware that unilateral regulatory re-
sponses alone will not be adequate or appropriate.
Despite the best efforts of regulatory and market authorities, the
one certainty is that no system of regulation can guarantee against
failures. The fact that post-Barings, fifteen regulators and 54 futures
exchanges signed up to a large exposure, information sharing arrange-
ment signals the resolve in the financial community that they must be
better prepared to address a similar event in the future.
Undoubtedly, newly established and evolving markets either
have faced or will face events and crises similar to those already ex-
perienced by mature markets. They are in the unenviable position of
being the latecomers to futures markets in a competitive global mar-
ketplace, and newly established regulators may come under great
pressure to develop an entire regulatory structure to meet market
start-up schedules. Although it is acknowledged and perhaps ac-
cepted that their rules and regulations will reflect the nascent and
evolving nature of their markets, emerging markets would be prudent
to put in place regulatory mechanisms which are familiar to the inter-
national financial community.
IV. ACHIEVING REGULATORY BALANCE: REGULATORY PRACTICE
MAKES PERFECT THEORY
National policy makers and regulators of financial markets must
understand that they cannot, through any means available to them,
regulate risk out of the system or be prepared for all contingencies.
The challenge they face, therefore, is to achieve a balance between
prudent regulation and acceptable levels of risk. Internationally, reg-
ulators agree on the components of a balanced regulatory system-
the system must have rules addressing market integrity and efficiency,
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financial integrity and customer protection. Efforts by international
organizations such as IOSCO give further content to these compo-
nents by developing international consensus on issues of universal in-
terest to regulators. Through this process, IOSCO plays a critical role
in delineating minimum standards of acceptable conduct and ensuring
that unchecked regulatory competition does not lead to a race to the
bottom.
Beyond that, however, it is clear that the manner in which this
balance is achieved varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. These dif-
ferences may be explained in large part by some or all of the following
factors:
* differences in history, culture and national customs and practices;
* legal or juridical distinctions among jurisdictions, for example, com-
mon law versus civil code;
* universal banking and non-universal banking or mixed jurisdictions;
• differences in level of market maturity;
* differences in objectives of statutory framework, that is, market integ-
rity, customer protection, or both;
* differences in the role of markets, for example, public or private mar-
kets, and type of market and market participants, for example, physi-
cal delivery market with predominately commercial participation or
market with significant retail participation;
" differences in market structure, for example, floor based or electronic.
Indeed, there are sharp philosophical differences in the scope of
the rules of major market jurisdictions, the measures they rely on to
achieve regulatory objectives and the weight they give to any particu-
lar measure.66
It would be naive to characterize any one system as better than
another. Some systems, for example, clearly maximize regulatory pro-
tection, but at cost levels and with a level of prescriptiveness which
would be unacceptable in many jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions,
the creation of a supervisory body solely in response to a perceived
political need "to have what everyone else has" may not materially
alter the way in which markets operate or behave, not unreasonably
leading one to conclude, as did Karl Marx in another context, if a
66 This does not mean that there are no areas of regulation which could benefit from harmo-
nization. The generic risk disclosure statement initiative referred to above is one example of a
technical, but significant aspect of futures regulation which lends itself to standardization and
simpler, more meaningful disclosure to customers with lower compliance costs for firms. The
difficulty of harmonizing requirements, however, is reflected in the fact that since its develop-
ment in 1994, only three jurisdictions have adopted the statement, notwithstanding the fact that
many jurisdictions participated in and endorsed the initiative and have statements which are
virtually identical to the generic text.
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regulator does not exist, the market will have to create one! If market
volume is any indication, however, no one system is more conducive
to market success than any other. For this reason, the wholesale im-
porting of another jurisdiction's regulatory system is rare and most
jurisdictions, in developing systems or initiating change, at best
"benchmark" their systems to other systems, or review such systems
to avoid pitfalls others have experienced.
Regulatory competition within the framework of internationally
accepted parameters enhances regulatory innovation and diversity.
By doing so, it provides a market mechanism which inhibits regulators
from adopting rules that impose excessive costs in respect of their
benefits. 67 It also creates choices for market participants, allowing
them to select regulatory levels that are most suitable to their current
circumstances and prevailing market conditions.68 And, as noted
above, it provides regulators the opportunity to engage in regulatory
benchmarking, permitting them to incorporate the best features of
other systems into their own systems which can lead to further regula-
tory evolution.
Last but not least, regulatory competition permits evolving mar-
ket jurisdictions for whom harmonization may be particularly difficult
to selectively implement rules and procedures most appropriate for
their needs in light of their financial services goals, to, in effect, "free
ride" on the experiences and/or misfortunes of other jurisdictions. It
is this concept of "regulatory leapfrogging" which essentially has been
endorsed by the G7 Ministers as means of minimizing systemic risk
resulting from the development of new markets.69
CONCLUSION
The appeal of standardization or harmonization of regulatory re-
quirements is difficult to discern. Very different regulatory ap-
proaches have led to equally successful results, and no one system will
work in all jurisdictions. The concern with regulatory competition is
that if unchecked, it can confirm the worst fears of those who advo-
cate regulatory harmonization-that it will lead to the lowest com-
67 Joseph A. Grundfest, Internationalization of the World's Securities Markets: Economic
Causes and Regulatory Consequences, 4 J. FIN. SERV. REs. 349, 372. See also Alan Greenspan,
Testimony before the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess., 30 (1990):
[I]n human affairs, whether it were in business, whether in government regulatory organiza-
tions, whether we're in any activity, competition is a very effective tool.
68 Id.
69 Lyon Communique, supra note 3, at 7.
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mon denominator in regulation. Perhaps, for this reason the term
"competition" used in the context of regulation is sometimes viewed
as pejorative and inappropriate.
Regulatory diversity, however, can and should be encouraged.
Market and business conditions change, and the regulations which
prescribe standards of acceptable conduct must evolve with such
changes. Innovations or new methods which achieve similar protec-
tion but in different and relatively less costly ways should be continu-
ously examined and considered for implementation. In a competitive
marketplace, regulators cannot afford to be either insular or parochial
in the way they go about making public policy decisions regarding
what constitutes prudent regulation and what are acceptable levels of
risk. Regulatory diversity should not be endorsed, however, without a
firm commitment by international regulators to cooperate to ensure
that the agreed rules of the game, which too may need to evolve, are
understood, accepted and observed.
